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CHAPl'ER I

HISTORY OF STOCK PURCHASE PUNS AND STOCK OPTIORS
The purpose ot this paper 1s to present a reasonabl3" adequate presentation of some ot the developnents in Stock Ownership Plans tor Employees.

Plans tar employee stock ownership have developed into two categories,
one more often relating to employees 1n general and the other more often
relating to a restricted number of employees, usuall.T executive.
Stock Purchase Plans.
in general, although some

These plans are usuaU,. designed tor employees
spec1tical~

exclude executive employees. Such

plans are designed primarily' to give more and more employees a direct

owner-

ship in the canpanies by whom the;r are employed. Perhaps the major problem

that' arises is the failure or inabilit:r of so man.v employees to tully comprehend the posits.on of a holder

or

common stock. Another problem in these

plans relates to the fact that, even i t employees were .tull;r aware of the
position

or a

holder

or common stock,

not all anployees are in a position

to take the risks that go with it, especial.17 in the corporation upon which
they depend for their salaries or wages.
Stock Option Plans,. These plans are usuall1' designed tor a relatively'

terr high-level employees and are motivated almost exclusivelT by reason ot
Federal income tax considerations. Among this group

a much better comprehension of the position

or them are

or a

ot employees there :t.s

ccmmon stockholder and more

:tn a position to take the related risks. The major problems in

these cases are (1) the ever-changing income tax laws affecting the taxabil-

it:r of profits that may result .from the options and (2) the ettocts on other
stockholders, part1oularl;r the minority stockholders.
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Because the problems that relate to employee stock ownership plans are
substant1all:r different in the pl.ans designed for employees in general as
against those designed tar certain executive employees, the two types or

pl.ans will be discussed separately after a review Of Stock Ownership Plans
for Employees 1n

general.

For manr ye8.rs stockholders, business executiws, and employees have

tollorredwith'interest various plans designed by certain corporations to
permit,' encourage, or assist employees to purchase capital stock 1n the companies b:Y whom the:r are employed. ·
On

December 17, l9S6; Hr. Keith Funston~: President· o.t the New York Stock

Ex:change, said,· "The Employee St0ck Ownership Plans

ot many large companies

are proving highly ef'i"ective in giving more and more Americans a.direct ownership interest 1n our business system,..;-br1ng1ng us nearer to a true democrac:y.nl

Tma popUlarity of Stock Omlership Pl.8ns has been and :ls still apparent
from the f'act

that appradmatel:r tort:r per cent or all domestic

companies

· having common stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange adopted stock purchase or stock option plans within the nine-year period from 1947 to

1957.

There were additional plans ·started prior to 1947, and many- have been put
into effect since· 1957. Such· plans are ·not in any- sense restricted to ccmpanies listed

on the New York Stock Exchange but rather cover corporations

or all siees and types.
Some of these plans have been eminently successful. in the attainment ot
their goals while others have been most unsuccessful.

Th:!.$ wide var:tat1on

l stock· Ownership Plans~ !nt>lczees, New York Stock Exchange,
Decanber 1, .1956., p. l. .
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in the degrees ot·succese ori"a:tlure bas resulted in certain deep-seated

anxieties as to the consequences of the use or th1s method of cultivating
the employee's loyalty to his own canpan:y and confidence in the private
enterprise system generally'. ·

Kost of the plans relate to canmon stock and :1.t is this fact that contributes largel.1' to the anxieties. Ho way has yet been found by which

employees, or

anyone else, ·can enjoy- the benefits of common stock ownership

without being subject to the related risks. In consideration of the risks
they assume, the owners of cO!lmon etock are claimants against all the corpo-

rate profits that remain after income taxes and responsibilities to preferred
stockholders have been met.

To the extent, · thereforet that common stock-

holders receive dividends that tall short of these profits, they make, on a

more or less permanent basis, further contributions to corporate assets.
There are many investors whose savings are such that they- should not in-vest

in securities that have the lowest olaim on profits, particularly' when :Lt is
very probable that a substantial portion ot the remaining profits will be

permanent]\r retained by- tbs corporation.· This partial retention of profits
canbines nth the absence ot a maturity- date to make the comnon stockholder
largely-

dependent on the "market" as a means ot recovery of his investment.

ThU8, market fluctuations come to assume too great a basis of gaitl or loss.
There is a related question. U an employee ts "investing" his life's

efforts as an employee of' a given corporation, m.ightit not be better tor him,
in order to spread bis risk, to invest his savings 1n another corporation.
It is difficult.to determine whether this point is more relevant when the
em.ploree's savings are little in amount and his duties as an employee have
no part

in management and policy decisions or when his savings amount to a

substantial

SU111

and his duties as

an employee do have a part in management

and polley decisions.

In the process ot the developn.ent ot these plans, since no one ot the
. plans is exactly like another, the more recent plans have brought with them

man1' new features.

These new features usually' have been designed in an

effort to 1mprove the chances of tho attainment of the ultimate goals or to

overcome certain impressive potential objections by the stockholders or a
part thereof.
The continued success or the many' emplOJ'8e stock owrterahip plans has

resulted 1n part from continued favorable economic conditions and changes in
the provisions ot the Federal income tax laws. It :ls interesting to note

that

The

Revenue Aot ot 1964 has materially restricted the income tax benefits

ot m.aft1' stock option plans.
While the list ot companies that have adopted stock Olfllership plans is
V8r1' impressive, it must be said that the list ot canpanies that have not

adopted

8tl1'

such plan is also impressive.

CHA.Pmt II
STOCK PURCHASE PI.AUS
Stock purchase plans are plans by which companies permit, encourage,
or .facilitate the acquisition

or stock by employees.

In making it possible

for an employee to acquire a substantial stock interest, a stock purchase
plan serves an objective long sought by maey' shareholders-giving management and other employees an identity with stockholders.

In sane corpora-

tions, stock purchase plans may eventually result in replacing "hired-band"
management with stockholder management.

Employees Elis!ble to Partioipa.te. Some plans are designed tor large
numbers of employees J sane include otfioers and key employees J still others
epecificall.1' exclude officers and key- employees.

The Fmployeest Stock Plan ot American Telephone and Telegraph Compmv
provides

ror

participation by ''aiv regular employee. • • • except officers

• • • .n2
The Employees' Stock Purchase Plan ot Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Compaey prov:J.des

tor participation

by "any empl()yee of the Compaey • • •

except (a) directors (b)·otticers (c) persons included in the StockOption

Incentive Plan. u3
The Employees• Stock Purchase Plan ot Canmomvealth Edison Canpany,·
hmvever, provides that "All regular employees ot the Edison Company, regardless ot their position or rate or pay- • • • may participate in the Plan a.a
long as they' are regularly employed."4

2 PrC?8J)ectus of American Tel!hone and Telef.?!ph Company, October 21, 19'4.
3 Prose:ctua
!§! Chesapea and .Q!i!2 fiailway Compan,y, April 28, 1955.
h rz-ospectus ~Commonwealth Edison canpanz, June 17, 1955.

R
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Assistance or Contribution

bl Canpanz.

In some plans the companies do

little more than act as agent or broker tar the employee, purchasing stock

for him in the market and at market price. Some companies take a further
step and advance loans to the elliploy9e to ·enabl.8 ·h1m to make the purchase, .

Still a further step takes place when the· ccmpany offers the stock to mployeee

at

some price below the current market price.

In some eaaos· the plan 't'llJ3.'9'

Prov;tde tor a contribution ot can.pa!J1' funds to employee. purchases, in effect

the equivalent or· an increase in his cmpensation •
.Amer1can·Telephone and Telegraph Compan;r sets a price on the stock as
follows• "The purchase price per share ••• will be $20,00 below the average
market price either

tor the month in which payment is canpleted or for the

next succeeding month, whichever is lonr •••

,n5

Bridgeport Brass ComparJ7 provides tor purchases at prevailing market

pr:t.ces. ibe company- su1'Ports :lts plan by explaining that there will be substantial savings under its plan by the elininat:lon ot brokerage costs,6
· The Commonwealth Edison Caapal\V' plan provides that tho price per share

will· be ninety per cent of the closing market price but not less than

$25.oo

per share.7

Genera1 Foods Corporation provides that tor each.five shares purchased
under its plan for the account of an employee-participant, the corporation
will deliver to him, Without coat, an additional share.a

Source of Stock. In the majority of oases previously authorized but
·unissued stock is wsed tor both stock purchase and stock opt1on plo.ns.

In

some cases; however, the stock is purchased on the open market.

5 ProSP!ctus of American To~hone and Teleg:ra~Wf.1l' October 21, 19.sh.
6 Prospectus ~ m"§eport
· ss ~~' Sep
r , 952.
1 Prospectus ~ Commonwealth Edison com,eanz, June 17' l9SS.
8 General Foods 021J2oration !nl>l9Y!es 5av.l!1j! Investment Plan,
November, 1955•.
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American Telephone and Telegraph Company set aside 3,0001 000 shares of

its authorized

but unissued stock for

its plan.

The Chesapeake and Ohio

Bailwa:r Compaeyreserved lX>,000 shares of common stock tor its plan out of

authorized but uniseued stock.
D1£f1culties. The encouragement or ownership of a company' a stock b;r
. employees is a matter

ot general interest to· business executives and one

over which there is great diversity' of opinion.

On the one hand there is

general belief' that conflicts between economic classes can be reduced bya
more widespread diffusion of securities among employees.

On the other band

there are very deep-seated fears as to the·consequences ot the use ot this

method of cultivating the employee's loyalt,' to his om company' and hiB
ta:i.th in the private enterprise econany-. ·These fears arise trom the tact

that no way baa 18't been found b:r which employees, or &l\YOne else, can enjoy
the benefits ot common stock with their risks. When the:r om stocks which
tluctuate seriously in valuet and in particular when they sustain losses

which are heavy in proportion to their means, then stock· ownership by

employees is likel;r to have tho reverse etteot f'ran that which was intended.
Instead of more eontidence in the compan;r, there is less contidenceJ and
instead of loyalt,>, there is likely to be disappointment and antagonism.

For

these reasons many businessmen hesitate to embark upon such plans. The:r
refer to some well-knorm plans of the 1920 1 s and earl:r 19.30*s in which
heavy losses

verr

were sustained by empl01E39 stockholders. The memor.r of these

still lingers, and one vice-president, referring to them, remarked, "We newr
had an employee stock purchase plan, tbank·God.n9

9 Thomas H. Sanders, Effects of Taxation on Executives (Boston:
Division of Research; Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University, 1951), P• 121.
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Since stock prices have risen impress!:ve:cy- since 1950, the plans
. started since 19S01
.~rtio1pants.

tor the most part, haw proven ver,r successful tor the

In most cues it would seem tbat stock purchase plans are

more suitable tor old, well-established companies in 'Well-knom industriea.10
In a117. case it would seem that any plans to otter the company• s stock
· to

its employees should be undertaken onl;r with great care and with the

frankest explamtion to the anployees of the ldnda ot risk they are Wlder- .•
taking, and

the possible consequences, Even registration statements filed

with the Securities and Exchange Commission do not fully cover all of the

problems involved. Their formal style

a~

technical statements make little

or no impression upon people not.trained to understand them. If a plan
cannot be presented to employees in plain and simple terms,. which will at
the same time inform them or the risks involved, and yet be su.t.ticiently
attractive to induce them to .buy the compatl1'' s stock, then the comparry• s

management bad better leave the problem or interesting workers in the private
enterprise system to other deviees.11
Efforts to Overcane Difficulties. The toll.owing excerpts from certain
companyannounceme11ts ot employee stock ownership plans illustrate efforts

to avoid some of the difficulties heretofore mentioned.
Bridg!Port Brass

Cgnpanz.

"No pranotion ot this plan bas been under-

taken because the Directors teel that any employee wishing to become a stock-

holder should

know

that such a plan 1s avail.able to h1m, but should not feel

any urge from management to take up the plan.12

10 Sanders, loc. cit.
11 Sanders, ~cit.', p. 123.
12 Prospectus 2£Br:tdseim-t Brass, .September 1 1 19~.
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The Cincinnati Gas and Electric CO!J?!ny•

"In the belief that the

investment :ln equity securities by employees"would tend to acquaint them
with scene or the problems confronting businese in general, and their company in particular, and that the ownership

them a greater sense ot responsibility

ot

such, shares would create in

toward the successful operation

ot

their company, as well as broaden their concept of the American free enterprise system.nl3

Commonwealth F.dison Canpa!ll• '1First, we are not trying to induce you

to

b~

Edison stock.

It you wish to participate 1n the Plan, we Will be

glad to have you do so. But your standing will not be atf'eoted in any way
by your decision.

No one is authoriaecl to urge you to participate.

"Second;· when you are making up your mind whether or not to buy' Edison

shares, you must rem.ember that the prices of common stock, including Edison
stock, go up and dom. At times the decline may be drastic.
"Third, once you have purchased Edison shares, they will be yours.

The

company will not buy them back from you at any time.

"Fourth, we recognise, and you should not hesitate to f'aoe the fact.;
that not all employees are in a position to take the risk that

goes

with the

ownership of common stock.nlh
General Foods Corporation. "Although we believe this plan to be a sound

one, we caution each employee to give careful consideration to his own
all financial situation and to the nature
we cite the element of risk in

or the program.

~

In our literatute

ccmm.on stock.nl$

13 ProBPE?ctus ~!!'.!!Cincinnati GEis !!!! Electric C~n.v, March l~, l9SO.
lh·ProsJ,?!!ctus ot Canmomrealth Edison, Junel7, 195~
lS ProsP<:c~us ~General Foods Corporation, November 28, 19$$.
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General Motors Corporation. "No one will urge them to take part in
this program.

Tho decision to do so will be entirel.1' their own.n16

fnland Steel Compan;r.

"Our program is voluntary.

Ho employee need

participate. In fact, great care is taken to explain that the pUl"Cbase

ot

common stock is a risk which might result in losses as well as profits.nl7
The success of

ma~

emplQ1eG stock ownership plans depend largely on

the success or the compaD1' involved.

were abandoned in the earl.7

l9~'s.

Ma117 such plans started in the 1920'e

some,

however, survived. An outstanding

er.ample of a surviving plan is that established by sears, Roebuck and Compalll'

on July l, 1916. As of December 31, 1955, there

1l'G%'e

1251 299 participating

employee-mEmbers. The company's contribution for 195S' (computed at ten pe1'
cent or consolidated net incane) was $40,362,020 and employees owned

l8,805,S06 shares or

2~.4 per

cent of the company's capital stock.

The Seara, Roebuck and Company plan 1a a Savings and Profit-sharing
Fund, control

over which is legally' and

financial~

separate f'rom compaD1'

management. The sources ot capital far the f'und are (l) the deposits ot
employee members, and (2) the annual contribution by the company. With these

tunds 1 shares ot Sears, Roebuck and CanpaflY' common stock are purchased.

l.6 Prosf?!ctus ot General Uotors Corporation, November, 195S.

17 Prospectus~ Inland Steel Conprq, July 13, 19$.S.

CHAPTER IV
SmmARY OF LISTING APPLICATIOlB FILED BY COMPANIES
LISTED ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCIJANGE 2 19h7-195S

The folloaing information was taken trom an analysis ot arrangements

tor issue of stock to employees, officers, and directors as described in
listing applications tiled between 1949 and 19.SS by ccmpanies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange.

ot the eighteen listing applications filed in 1947, only eight plans
represented stock purchase plans and ten represented stock option or compensation plal'lS. Seven of the eight stock purchase plans covered all regular

employees whereas all ten stock option or compensation plans were limited to
executives or key employees. All
f'1r'

~ight

or the etock purchase plans provided

installment purchases, sane over periods as long as ten years.
ot the twelve listing applications in 19h8, ten provided tor stock

purchase plans and onl,y two for stock options. Seven plans covered officers
and employees, two plans covered oniy selected executive employees, and one
covered only key' employees. In this year, three of the ten plans required
f'u1l cash

pa~ent

and.oeven bad a provision tor installment purchases.

The following schedule shows the increase in the popularity of stock
ownership plal'lS tor employees and the breakdomt of these plans u between
stock purchase plans and stock option plans.

'l'b1s was prepared f'ran listing

applications filed with the New York Stock EK:change during the years shown.
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TOTAL NUMBER
OF NEW PIAJ5

-1949
!EAR

22
29

19$0
1951
19S2

7h
94
77

1953
19!)4

19S5*

77
8h

NUMBER OF

NUMBER OF

N&i STOCK

NElV STOCK

PURCHASE

%OF

CHANGE

FRW 1949

PIA15

-

18

28.00

25

l5
17

-16.67

-5.55

22
21
21

22.22

16.67
16.67

OPl'ION
PI.Am

%OF CHANGE
FRCU 1949

--

4

h

59

77
55
'6
63

1375.oo
1825.oo
127S.OO

1))().00

lh75.oo

*(10 mos.)
Source: Stock Ownership Plans forof:?lOY;!!S, New York Stock Exchange,
December, 1956; pp. ll.R •

Generally', the majoritJ'

Of

the stock purcbaae plans listed above covel'

all regular employees.
Fran the above it is obvious ,that while the numberot stock plans for
employees among the ccmpanies listed on the Ne1r York Stock Exchange increased

fran tnnt,....two in 1949 to a high ot eighty'-four in 19.$2, there was little
increase in stock purchase plans covering employees in general,

In l9h9,

there were orilT tour stock option plans among companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, bttt the number increased to fifty-nine in 19$1 and

high ot seventy-seven in 1952.

a

OHAPJ.'lm V

STOCK OPl'ION PLA?B

!'!Wses. Stock options help a ccmpany create adequate er:ecutive
incentives and rewards. Toda.1's tax rates, living costs, an:t expenses inci-

dent to executive office render it difficult, it not impossible, for executives to accumulate an estate from savings out

~current

ccrnpensation·, The

stock option plan involves no corporate expenditure or funds and, in tact,
brings more funds into the business. · It provides a method for the smaller
compaey, the growth company, the canpany with leverage stock, and the c<>mpany'

unable to otter·subatant1al cash rewards to compete tar executive talent with
large established businesses.
!zlRloYt:es El;isible to Participate. The groeat majority of stock option
plans to cover only executives and key employees. General purchase plans

open to all anployees, such as those heretofore discussed, do

~t

satisfy

all the purposes involved in giving executives and key employees a substantial
interest in their business, of a kind that is like4' to serve as an effective

incentive. In particular; the close connection between successtul executive
.

.

.

effort and profits cannot be expressed in· the tom ot general stock purchase
plans. For this purpose stock opt.ions are comonly regarded by

C:SOl!lpatd.~

as

the suit.able instrument• the one most attractive to executives.
· ~feet ot Federa1 Income

TaX Legislation.

The substantial increase

in

atook option.plans in recent years ma7 be traced in large part to legislation
first.passed in 1950, oonf'erring epecU'io Federal income tax benetits on
rest.rioted stock options.

The legislation, in substance, provided that 1£ a nontransferable stock
option is granted to an employee 1 and it at the time of the grant the option

price is at least ninet:Y'-five per cent of the market value ot the stock
covered by the option, no tax will be imposed when the option is exercised.
The

tax payable will be at capital gains rates on any protit if and when the

stock is sold. H09'0Ver1 the stock cannot be disposed of betore two years
from the time the option is granted.

The law also required the holder to

wait six months arter exercising his option before selling the stock obtained.
Review of Federal Income Tax Status.

ot stock options

The contusion over the taxabilit7

has a long history- extending back to 19211 when Congress

set up separate rate structures for ordinar.r :lncane and capital gains. As
long as incane tax rates remained relatively low, this cleavage wasn•t too

hlportant, and for years the Commissioner ot Revenue held that the profit on
emplo~e

stock options was extra canpensation and taxable as ordinary- incQlle

at the time the options were exercised and the stock acquired. In 1938, the
Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court) ruled

that an option granted to an

executive o:r Continental Can Company- ns a 11 proprietary'1 option and his profits when the option was exercised were not taxable as ••canpensationu. The

.folloaing year the Treas\11'1' Department decreed that all prot1ta on prop:d.ef.ar1

options would be taxed, not on acquisition ot the stock, but when the stock ·
was sold, and then on'!1' at capital gain rates. The Treasury' agreed to con-

sider the evidence 1n each case and decide whether the option was proprietal'J'
or CQ!lpensator,r. other executives subeequentfy defended their options aa
proprietar;r,. but often the courts held them to be compensatory-. The decisions
hinged on a number of factors including the stated "intent" ot the option,

the length of time before it could be exercised, whether or not it was
assignable, eta. But the factor that seemed most. decisive was the degree

ot

spread between the option price and the marlmt price at the

option was granted.

t:t.me the

The narrower the spread, ·the more likely it was that·

the option would be held proprietary.· The rule was not rigid; however, the
spread 1n Geeseman•s 11proprietarY" option ns forty-five per cent.

The contusion aver tax.ability of options was further compounded ~n

l94S

when the Supreme Court held 1n the Smith case that the profit reallied by
John H. Smith when he exercised an option granted by- his employer, the
Western Cooperage Company', was

taxable as ordinary incane,; even though there

had been no spread between the option price and the value of the stock when
the option was granted. The court declared that the section of the revemie
law that defines gross income 111s broad enough to include in taxable income

any economic or beneficial benet1t conferred on the employee as ccmpensat1on
wbateVer the form or mode by which it 1s errected11 •

On the strength of this,

the TreaSU%7 ruled that options issued after the Supreme Court decision would

be regarded as canpensatory· and the profits taxed as ordin8r.r 1ncc:ue when

the options were exercised.
This ruling

tOz.

thoro~ dampened

down enthusiasm ot business executives

stock options, and between 1946 and 1950 very few plans were in:Ltiated,

H0vrever, during those years 'J.mryers, corporation executives, and spokesmen

tor ·the tlational Association of Uanufacturers, the New York City- Bar
Association, and the New York State Society or Certified Public Acoountanta
~

Congress to ease the treatment accorded options.

Tbs

195<> Revenue

Act did so and provided the way- tar corporations to grant "restricted stock

options" that would provide capital gains regardless or what the ca.upany• s
mOtivea in granting the option might be.
Congress, however, attached a few restrictions. Among the conditions

that must be met betore an option can qualify are 1

(l) the option cannot

be transferred.

(2) the anployee receiving the option cannot hold more than
ten per cent of the aanpany' s voting stock.
·
(3) the employee has to exercise his right to purchase while
he is enplo.ve<I, or within three months after leaving the
CQllpB.ny.

.

.

(4) the stock purchased cannot be sold for at least two years
after the option 1s granted.
($) the atook bas to be held tor more than six months atter
the option is exercised.

· (6) the option price can be no lovrer than eighty-five per
cent of the ttfa1r market valueo when the option was
granted.
·
(7) when the price was between eighty-five per cent and
ninety-five per cent, the entire spread between the
option pr.tee and the market value when the option is
granted will be taxed as ordinary income, but only when

the stock ia sold.

Except tor these restrictions, however, Congress 1mpl1c1tl.7 let all
other advantages of stock options stand. There was, tor example, no limit

on the number of shares that may be ottered or on the number oE option
offerings, or on the number or earnings of employees who may participate.
Thus, the

1950 Revenue Aot left enormous

option plans.

latitude for variety among rostrioted

In tact, no two option plans are alike. Some companies otter

options to only one or two menJ tor example, President Frank Stanton ot the

Columbia Broadcasting

System

in 1954 held options to buy- a total ot ,0,000

ebares of his company•s stock for $1,703,000. Some option plans are extended
to

"keY" exeoutivesJ others include

on~

officers. While most companies

Umit their option otters to unissued stock, the percentage ot total option
shares to outstanding stock prior to the option may range anywhere from l
to· 10 per cent or more.

Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, tor example,

ottered over.11 per cent. In genernl, restricted stock-option plana have

l?
tended to favor an option price

or

ninet1'-'five per cent

or market value,

rather than the permissible e1ghty--f1ve per cent. By limiting the option
spread to five per cent, or by eliminating the spread entirel.T, a c<.mpa117

can assure an executive that all his option profits will be .treated as
. _capital gains. Moreover, a small spread is less 11.kel.T to anno:r stockholders
when they are asked to approve the plan.

Approval or option plans by stockholders has not stopped attacks on
the legality ot such plans. One of the few restricted-option cases decided
against a corporation involved California Eastern A1rwa18; Inc. In

19~2

the Delmmre Supreme Court declared the company's option plan invalid because
it did not include a clause requiring the executive to remain with the com-

pan.v tor a reasonable time, and thus in effect ottered rewards to management
.with no guarantee of a return to the corporation. Since this decision,

.man.v companies

have revised their option plans to include "employment

clauses" that require participating executives to serve the company for at
least one or two years.

Though the restricted stock option attracted a host of companies atter

19SO, some executives and la1lyera thought such options still had several
"weaknesses".

One was the requirement that an executiw hold his option

stock tor- s:lx months be.tore he sold 1t, since even this minimum gamble could
cost h1m a sizable sum. 1t the market value

or the

stock happened to drop

during the time he· held the stock. Thie danger was amply' illustrated in the
case

or

the restricted stock option on 1001 000 shares that Radio Corporation

ot America granted in l9SO to Chairman David Sarnoff. Sarnoff obtained

t1,77S,ooo

in personal loans from banks and exercised his option 1n Februar7,

19S3, when R.C.A. stock was worth $2.S.So, or $7.7S above the option price.
Five weeks later the stock price had risen to $28.25,, and 1f' Sernott bad

16
been tree to sell, he would haw had a capital gain o.t $1,05o,ooo. But
then the stock began to tall,
period expired,

R.c.A.

and~

September when the six months• holding

had dropped to $23.50.

Since the banks were umr.llllng

to renew hie personal loans in full, Sarnoff' decided to sell some ot his
stock. To avoid depressing the falling market, he sold ?S,000 shares oft

the market to private investors through Lazard Freres and Company' for about
.

.

821.5<> a share. This gave him #1,612,SOO, but to this he bad to add most

of his personal sav:l.nga to pay o£t his loans and acquire the remaining

25,000 shares tree and clear. Had Sarnoff been able to hold on to all his
option stock, be would have bad a potential capital gain of
of m1d-0Ctober,

19~.

$1,487,~

as

As it turned out, he made a capital gain ot $2811 25<>

on the 7$1 000 shares and bad a potential gain of $3711 875 on his ranaining

251000 shares as ot mid-October.
It ns not considered likely that Congress would relieve executives

ot the necessity of taking at
For,

~requiring

least six months' gamble on restricted options.

this holding period, Congress intended to prevent 1ns1ders

from manipulating a company''s stock by frequent trading. However, two
changes

in the Revenue Act passed eubsequent]3' made it possible fem companies

to protect executives ll'ho have unexercised options against a deol:tne in the
market value·or the ccmpany's stock.
Under the new·rule

on

the "modification, extension, or renewal" of a

restricted stock option, a compan:.v could lower the option price ot a stock
whose average market value over the preceding twelve months had been more

than 20 per cent below the market price when the option was granted. Protection against a short-term decline in a stock• e market value was provided
by a

new "variable atook-opt1on" rule. This allowed an executive to exercise

his option at a price that could be

as per cent

(or more) o.t arry market

19
wlue of the stock d111'1ns a spec1.t1ed six-months' period, and the option
must be exercised in that period. Thus, 1t the market pr:lce ol his company• a stock dropped, an executive can nit and exercise bis option at the

lowest price during the six-monttas• period.
OQ'JJ.pa.nies whose stocks were either closely held, not traded frequently,

or not listed on securities exchanges have tound restricted options more
d:ltt1cult to employ. For some years one problem was the requirement that
restricted stock options be granted only to holders ot less than 10 per cent

ot a canpany' s stock. This irked owner managers who naturall.1 wanted options
themselves, and who argued that :tr they offered stock options to other

managers in their companies they might lose voting control. The 19$4 Revenue

.Act rE1?1ed1ed this by permitting the grant of five-year stock options to
holders ot more than 10 per cent of a company's voting stock on condition
that they pay at least 110 per cent ot the fair market value for their option

stock. But Congress has so tar done nothing to solw the chief option problem facing thousands ot small and closely held canpanies. This is the

difficulty ot fixing a "fair market value'' for their stock. A cC111patl1' offering the executives rest.1-icted options may sit an option price at what it
estimates to be

SS per

cent

ot

the stock's market value.

But the Treasur.r

may claim that the real market value is much higher than the compallY''s
est1ma.te, and that the option price is therefore less than

8,

per cent. Such

option would not quality as "restr1otedt' and all the profits accrued when
the option was exercised would be taxed as ordinary income.

This would be

so, at least, unless the company would convince the Treasury or the courts

that the option was indeed "proprietarytt •
The only alternative to proving that a nonrestricted option 1s proprietary is for a canpany- to admit that the option is designed to provide

20

compensation. For an executive to get capital-gains treatment on this kind

ot option, a different concept was. adopted,
namel.1' that the option .:ttselt
.
is considered to have.value. Thie value is the compensation intended. It

the executive

is willing to pay income taxet'! on this ftlue far

the year the

option ia granted, he may be able to secure capital gains treatment on all
profits realized on bis.option.
. . The ei'forts of corporations to aecure capital-gains benefits for
executives by granting them options are, ot course, quite legitimate. But
do much emphasis has been placed on the tax-avoidance aspects or options
that it bas tended to obscure the basic purpose ot granting options, which

:ts to gi'V'e executives an incentive to stay with a compan,y and help improve

its earnings.
Some companies, such as Corn Products Refining, use stock options as
a form of deferred compensation to ease the economic problems ot retfrem.ent.
other canpanies, such aa lloore-UcCormack Lines, prefer to award options to

younger men who are expected to boost earnings tor many- years. In still

other.companies, .options are used as a short-term incentive for kq executives.

Yale and Towne M'anutacturing CompatJT,

:vear option plan in 19501

tor example,

adopted a f1ve-

which provided that executives who received the

options could not exercise them. for at .lea.et three years. B,- this restriction
President .Gilbert

w.

Chapman aimed to hold together for at least three

~

the new executive team he had set up.

Effectiwness or Pl.ans. The big test ot the incentive-producing value

ot option plans, ot course, w1l1 arrive when-and-it there is a prolonged
decline in the stock market.

In a booming bull market, stock options haw

brought many executives immense profits-on paper at least. The,-•ve enabled

21
hundreds

ot companies to bang on t.o

from other

keY' executives or to attract

top t.alent

companies~

When stock prices talll many- stock option plans) far the time being at
least) become wrtbless

to both companies and

executives~

In

19$7~

during

a slump in stookmarket prices, some stock option plans tared about as

tollcwsr
Figure I
COf!PANY

OPl'ION PRICE

AlaSka Juneau Gold
Black and. Decker
Cincinnati Gas and Electric

Columbian Carbon
Eastern Stainless Steel
Emerson Radio
Flintkote

Or819on-Rob1nson .
Korvette
National Steel
Pennsylvania Railroad
Royal KcBeG

Banta Fe Railroad
Scott Paper
Shell OU

• 3.2;
30.39

CURREN? MARKET

$

2.5o

38.SO

26.00

19.00

bS.oo

3S.oo
b.2;
36.00
S.37

39.90
6.25

)).00

42.oo

3.7S

10.00

13.62

62.So
21.00
. 38.00

16.12
23.12

~9.00

28.SO

19.62

Sh.37

77.00

10.5o

81.14

. Such a situation brought fcirth canments such as,

11

sure,

no one promised

me I•d make money- on the option, but it waa held out as an employment attnc-

t1on and now it' a a mirage" J "I•ve got an option you can have right now".
A taltering stock market has made many an a>eeoutive•a employment contract tar less attractive than when he signed it •

.c~ reactions

to executives• comments wried fran serious concern

to amazement that their executives may- be disgruntled because their options
are worthless at present •. One COJJIP8D3' president snapped, "Wf\v should our

people be upset? After all., it•s difficult far them to lose on options,

ther don't have to exercise them, you know". Another said, "It you are after

22
a quick profit on a stock option plan, you have no business asking ;your
stockholders to approve it".18
It the stock market should slump

at
0

.lea.st

drast1ca~,

restricted option plans

could be ttmodilied" to give some executives a new start on their

tree-r1de" at a lovrer option price. This, however, would not protect those

who had already exerciaed their options, and it

many

ot them chose to cash

in their profits betore the ccmr:pany's stocks tell belov the option price,
they could ecarcelY' be blamed.
support the theory that

But such profit taking would obviously- not

such options increase the executive's sense ot

ownership.
The incentive value

measured.

ot stock options, ot course, cannot be

accurate~

For one thing, the movement ot an;r company's stock price is

atteoted by man;r factors aver which management baa little or no control.

Wars, depression, intlation, as well as maey other more modal'ate economic
and physical factors ma:r well cause changes in a company' e comon stock
market value

tar

beyond what

management may control. Moreover, an execut1-p

may become so absorbed :ln nuctuating personal paper profits that he neglects
h1s dally chores.

llr. Sarnoff,

ot Radio Corporation

Of Amer1ca. 1 referred to

earlier might bave been an example of th1s possibility. It 'll'OUld certa1nl3'

appear that Vr. Sarnoff was faced with matters of a most pressing nature and

rd.ze.
other incentive systems, like bonuses tied to performance,

ma:r seem

better to sane companies. Restricted stock option plans often are a sore

point with sane company stockholders.

Their canplaints include:

(1) stock-

holders generall:r aren't eligible to buy the stock at a lower-than-market

18 "Ailing Options,," ~!!!!Street Journal, October 21, 1957.
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price, (2) ccmpany officers already

are getting enough momy,

(3) the

granting ot options increases the amount or oa:nmon stock outstanding, thus
reduces earnings per share, and (4)

u

corporate officers have any faith in

their mm company, they will invest 1n its stock via the open market.

Difficulties of Plans.

~spite the profit potential in ma113' option

plans, the,- often operate under ma!lY' dUf1cult1es.
How can the option bolder afford to purchase the securities ottered
to him? A right to buy stock may make an attractive incentive until the
t:lme comes to find the cash to pay for it.

In the case of many current

stock options, inadequate attention has been given to this problem of financin1u

as a result, the potential benefits to both managenent and the stockholders
have been largel.T lost.19

Uuch crit1c1sm 1s directed not against the principle of the stock Option
plan, but against the unplarmed type of option wbich, ot necessity, w:1.ll
require the executive to sell a substantial block of stock 1n order to pay
for a relatively' tfl'if shares. This eelt-f':lnanoing type of option is expensive
to the canpany. Also, it may be loaded with
'

Here are a

potential~

serious questions.

'

tew of

the ditficultiess

(1) Rapid shrinkage-the wasteful

nature of the self-financing option is evident when we consider how maD1'

shares must be sold to finance the purchase of the remainder. The exact
nmber will vary with the percentage increase of the market

rNer

the option

price but, under aey realistic assumption, the percentage sold Will have to
be substantial.

19 Harvard Business Review, Karch-April, l9S7, p. 137.

Figm'e II
SEU'-FINAMOINO OF A ].()()().SHA.RE STOCK OPrION AT

Appreciated
Jlarket Frice
Per Share
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in Price
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Number

Number ot

Shares That Can
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Shares That

Hust Be Sold

841

359
273
360

·727

640

S71

' ll29.

250

7r;J

soo

So\Jrce ~

or

500

Harvard Business Review, Yaroh-AprU, 1957, p. l37

Dilution ,of F1nity•. The issuance or so man;y shares

sole~

to enable

the executive to finance his option may also be wasteful fran the stockholder

point of v.t.ew. It the option stock is authorized but previously- unissued
and the executive must sell part of his option shares in order to acquire
and retain the remainder, a dilution or equity will take place which hurts
the executive as well as other shareholders. FOl' instance:

Assume an option plan involves

s~

of the company-ta outstanding ebares

at the t1me the plan is adopted. Assume further that 7'5"' of the option shares
must be sold to finance retention of the balance.
~

Upon these assumptions,

ot the total stock outstanding after exercise of the option will have

been :Issued and outstanding 1n the bands

or the public at large solely-to

permit executives to retain an interest of only
~ost

1.2~

in the canpany.

to the Comps.mi;. As distinguished from dilution ot stockholders•

equiey, there rill be a cost factor to the company in the case
Ul'dssued and treasury stock.

or both

Thie cost can be considered the spread between

the option price and market price of the option shares at the time ot

exercise ot the option, since the company, 1n the absence of underwriting

costs; brolmrage, or other factors, would ordinar113' be able to sell the
option shares tor their market value.

The cost factor is sometimes referred

to u dilution. Thus, the Thiokol Chemical Corporation, in proposing an

officers' abd employees• stock option plan, etateds
"llanagement 1e mindful

or

the tact ••• because ot the ver:I' nature of

an option, at 8tJ1' time when the options might be expected to be exercised,

the Corporation probabl3' would be able to sell the shares subject to option
tor higher prices than the option prices and the sale of such stock at the

lOlll'er option prices will have the effect of diluting the position 0£ ex:isting
stockholders". 20
Stockholders Objections to Plans. While the restricted stock options
are understandabl.7 popular with ex:ecut:lves who have received them, support
far options is clearly- not unammous. A majority of the canpanies with l1sted

securities on the New York Stock Ezchange have not yet adopted such plane.
Although ferr top executives in these canpanies are prepared to criticise stock
options (management obviously' doesn't want to denounce a plan

it~

one da7

decide to use-to attract a new president, far ex.ample), there is a general

awareness in management of the case that can be made against prei'erent1al
tax treatment for executives.
tat'

In a 1950 speech to the American Bar Association,

instance, Dean Ervin N. Griswould of the Harvard law School asked the

central questions
llhioh are

11 Is

rep~

there real.l1' •DY' decent just1tication tor the handouts

about to be given to a special tew taxpayers?"

It is

still a ditticult quest:ton to answer. For it raises many issues on 11hich

even top managements are not unan1mous.
20 Harvard Business Review, Knrch-Apr:J.l, 19S71 P• 138.
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Are stock options real.J3 needed to attract new managers or to keep

valuable key men from leav.t.ng? And are such options, which are. general.13"
limited to top executives, good

tor ccmpaeyta employoes, public and stock-

bolde%' relations?
'

Kost enecitically',. do stock options

real~

accomplish what mall)" manage-

ments expect them toJ i.e., do they. increase an executive's incentive to
!mprove company earnings

b1 giving him "a stake in the business"?

Negative answers to all these questions have not been lacld.ng. The

sharpest

oriti~

of

option plans have been.minority stockholders who have

generally attacked such plans on three countsr first, that granting options

to btJ7 at bargain prices dilutes the

equit~

or

other stockboldersJ second,

that. high-priced executives should not need an extra incentive to do their
best tor the. companyJ and third, that options do not induce a "sense ot owner-

ship" in an executive unless there is sane assurance that he will continue

to hold a .substantial part of his option shares.

Harv managements,

as already noted, have concluded that stock options

are. ttot suited to their companies.

Some of' the best managed companies 1 such

as General Motors, have decided to continue to rely' on the incentive of a
substantial bonus (in 0-U case, usuall.7

partJ.7 in stock) that can

much.more directlf to an executive's year-by-year performance.

be tied

In other

companies, pensions and deferred-profit sharing plans are used to stimulate

nraagers. Om of the biggest disadvantages of a .stock option plan 'RS cited
by. Preaident Joseph A. Grazier of American Radiator and Standard sanitary

corporatiosu "In a staid company like ours llhose stock 1a not rising fast,
an executive probabl3' could make enough on his option to provide aey real
~cent:tve, and if

the atock drops, his morale will

probab~ go down

too•.
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Advantage!\! or Pl.ans. Yet, stock options have sane real advantages tor
the corporation as well as the salaried executive.

Owing

to the cap1tal-

ga1ns treatment accorded profits on restricted stock options, the granting

ot such options may cost the ccmpan:r much less than the granting ot a eala17
increase

large

enough to net the executive as much as the profit on hie

option.
-

Also,

a general
o.ff'er ot stock options,
in fact, Often is the onJ¥
.
.

way a company can acquir&-or retain-the services of a top notch manager.

It appears to bQ trne that the chance to acquire an estate through
stock options undoubtedly produces acme increase in an executive's desire
to stay with the company and keep it profitable,

It appears f'ran available 1ntormat1on that stock options for officers
and key enployees continue to be a major device used by nany- companies to

obtain or retain outstanding executives, in spite or what appear to be valid

objections to certain features or many plans that have been put :lnto et.teot,
Review

ot General Electric CgnPS;n.Y Plan. In its 1956 annual report,

General Electric Company includes the tolloring comment relative to its stock

option plan,
"A total

ot $6,8lh,3411fa8 received in 1956 fraa the sale of 267,668

eh.ares or previously unissued stock to holdere
under the CompatJ7'• Stock Option Plan.

sented the
Account.

8$ par value of

The .balance of

or restricted stock options

Of this total,

$11 338,:bO repre-

the shares sold, and was added to the Common Stock

tS,476,001 was

added to Investiment :ln Excess

ot

Par Value ot Canmon Stock.
The Stock Option Plan, approved by the holders of ')7.8%

voted at the

1953 Ammal Meeting,

provides

ot the shares

tor the granting ot restricted

stock options to key employees. · The option price is market value on the
date of grant, so there is ·no benefit to the option holder unless the market
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price of the· stOck. increases, which benefits all share owners. This acts

as .incentive for the employee.to use his best

errorts

onbehalt of the

Company. As inducement to remain 1n the service .or- the Company', options

mat

not ·be exercised 1nmediately-, but onl;r in annual installments (over a period
'

general~ ot. nine

'

'

to ten years) which bec.ana .exercisable as the individual

remains in the emplOJ" ot the Canpanv.
~t the beginning of

19S6, General Electric Company bad a total ot.

3,258,195 shares of common stock subject to outstanding options •.. No addi-

tional restricted stock options for purchase ot the Canpany•a caumon atock
were granted 1n 1956J 2671 668 shares were purchased, aa noted in the follow.

'

'

ing BtrrnmaX7J 76 1 771 shares were deducted traa orig:lnal grants in 1956 because

ot

~the., ret~ents

and nthdrawals1 leaving outstanding options for

2,913,7?6 shares at the end of 1956. These outstanding options were held
by

917 individuals. In eutmtt1ng the Plan to share owners, it n.a estimated

that between 700 and 1200 ice,. employees would eventua~ participate in the
'

Plan.

Of

'

h,200,000

sharea which the share ownere authorized Ear use under

the Plan, 6a0,364were unallotted at the close of 1956.
..
.
.
A summarr of 19$6 transactions is ehovm beloss
'

Opt:t.on

Price

Year of

Grant

Net

Installments

·Or1ginal

Not Yet ,

Orants

3/Ji

19S3

l,h23,363

h$
$2 1/4

19~

608,698

$23

2h i/6·' 19S3

19$5

788,7h2'

698 2833
~a~9.t(;~

Exat'Cisable

939,lh6

Shares
Exercisable
Inst.allments·As .Purchased
Yet U!!£?urob.ased in 19$

76,S2h

176,312

.$32;806
466,267

121,,727

618z?l6
~1~.1935

?l,7S3
17,900

356,m~r

~~lz~S

80,1$6

78,414

1~703

In ol"der to canbat and doubtless overccrne the possible stockholder crf'

ot dilution

of capital

interest, General Electric grants options to key

employees at the current marlmt on the date ot grant, so that there 1s no
benefit to the option holder unless the market price of the stook increases,
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which benefits all abare owners.
'l'o

overcane the objection that in sane sys in

ma~

cases restricted

iD

stock Option plans do not actuall\r seri'e as incentives to ma.nagement1

addition to the fact that, unless the market 'Value or the stOok increases
above the value at the t:lme o£ the option grant, there 1s no profit,. Oerleral

Electric induces holders ot such options to remain in the service ot.tba
Compaey b!1' not permitting the options to be· exercised inmediately but on:cy-

in annual installments over a period of nine or ten years. It appears that

General Eleotric's plan must result 1n more incentive to stay t.ban mar>;.1pl.ans
under which the option may be exercised in full in a relat:t.ve:cyi- short t!me.

In these cases, a key employee, having exercised his option in fUl1 and having

a substantial capital gain at hand, might easily be attracted to another

company-,

perhaps

under a comparable plan.

According to :lnf'ormat!on published by the New York Stock EJ:obange,

General Electric's stock option plan provides for the stock obtained from
such options to be paid tor in full in one payment. This requirement

or a

single cash payment in full leaves quite a problen at least for some Of the

option holders. General Electr:t.c•s annual report states that h,200,000 shares
had been set aside for their plan and that :lt was estimated that between 700

and 1200 key- employees would eventuall\1 participate. It alsO states that at

the end of 1956 there

were

outstanding options for 2,913,756 shares and that

these options were held b1' 91? 1ndiv1duals. Assuming that a middle figure

o.t 9$0

tmy employees eventual.lY participate .in the 4,200,000 set aside

tor

the plan, the average part:tc:tpent will be given an option or options far
apprad.matel.14 1421 shares. On the basis

or

the la.at option price

ot

$~

l,lh,

the total cost per participant w:1ll be appraximatel.7 $2.»,m. It is reasonable to assume that certain high-ranking key' employees have or will receive

nt0re ehares and,

or course,

some less. With today's high income taxes, the

outlook for a continuation ot such high taxes, and the standard ot living
normal.33 associated with such top keY' employees, the paymettt; ot $230 1 99'1 1a

a major obstacle. A s!ndlar computation of the average number ot shares per
participant at the end ot 1956 results in a cost per key employee of appraxi..

mately $197,000. This amount, too, is a formidable obstacle.
It might be said that the financing of a key employee's stock is h1s

own personal problem and does not in aey traY' concern General Electric. It
JD8.Y' be said that ever:1

b~

ot stock bears this same responsibility and that

General Electric•s key employees are and

perhaps

should be like the othersJ

that it he can't af'ford to buy the etock, he shouldn't buy it.

There m&.Y'be a YeJ!'9' substantial difference between a·General Electric
key employee option holder and the average stock buyer.

It 1ir. Bl..ank, a

General Electric key employee option holder has exercisable option rights

tor h.421 shares, which were granted to him when the price ot the stock was

· $S2 l/h, and the current market price of the stock was 875, he would
be in the position

perhaps

ot not being able to afford to buy the stock: and at the

same time ot not being able to at.ford to neglect to realize a capital gain

ot $1001 S78, particularly it he felt that 875 was a

good price

tar the stock.

Even though he :ls a key employee of a large eompaD,7' with a very substantial
salary, Ur. Blank might never undertake to buy- stock

tn

one compal'>Y' costing

$230,997.

O:f.' the wr1ous criticisms or restricted stock option plans, General

Eleotr:lo'e plan seems to be vulnerable to that or not
paying tor the stock.

~on.ding

means tor

In the absence ot reasonable provisions far maldng

pa:yment tor the stock um.er option, unless Mr. Blank had a larger personal

estate,

espec~

as to available cash, than most key

emp~s

have, his
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on'.cy means of financing his purchase would be to dispose of a portion ot
his stock :tn·order to pay-for the part be could hold.
. As far

as

the 1956. annual report disclosed Gt,neral Electric does not ·

require a ke7 employee to retain his stock but rather seeks to induce such

employee to remain in the service of. the .compa.ny but making the options
•

t

•

"

mcercisable oni,- in annual 1nstallr:1ents over a period
ten

~

'

genera~

of nine or

so long as the individual remains in the employ ot the Compaey.

Recent

~

on Restrioted Stock Option Plans. "Under

~

Restricted

Stock Option Pl.an far key employees of the Company and its subsidiaries,
appr<>Ved by the Stockholders at the l9S7 Annual ?ie~irtfb on Januar.r 1 1 1962,

there were 3761 200 shares issuable under outstanding options and 282,187
Ul'loptioned shares available for the granting of options. During 1962, options
for a

total~

11,200 shares expired and, there.tore, on December 31, 19621

.there were 36.$1 000.shares issuable under outstanding options and 293,387
unoptioned shares available for the granting of options. No options were
either granted. or exercised during 1962 and there was no change in the .

exercise price; viz., $21.00 per share urde1' all options except one for
1,000 shares as to which
The tact

the exarcise price was $19.00

per share.1121

'.t.bat no opt10ns were exercised during 1962 is not surprising

since the market price ot the stock stayed below the option price ot $19.00
throughout the entire year.
"The incell'tive stock option plan far emcutives 1 .adopted at the 1959
annual shareholders' meeting provides that up to 3,000,000 shares of Jersey•s

capital stock 'l!IB.'1' be optioned at prices not less than 100 per cent ot market
21 !h!· Pennmvania ·Railroad c~El Annual Report
December Jl, 1§62~p. .32.
'

tor

the year ended

value on the date ot grant.

Changes that occurred during the year in the

outstanding options, which may be exercised after two years or continuous

employment f'ollcndng the date ot grant.. are summarized in the

accanpa~

table.

PI>tion Chanses Dll:ring·1962
· Outstanding, December .31, ·1961
Granted (to 625 executives at an average
ot &S6. 79 per share)

less: ElcercisGd
Expired or canceled
Outstarding, Decso.ber 31; 1962

2,222,983

shares

688,$00.sharee
(362,17S) shares

(16,309) s~
2

2,533,,399 "shares

Figures are not yet available to show canparable intormation tor

19631

but with the market price at the close of business on Yarch 11, l96b, ot
· $813/4, it li'Ould be reasonable to forecast considerable activity- under this

option plan.

nccrporatiom' stock option plans fOl' their ezeoutiws are

eitpeeted

to

be the object ot more than usual attention at annual meetings this spring.

The plans, always controversial, have become more so recently. Some stock•
holders probab]Jr Tlill have many questions to ask. The heightened interest
has developed

t.rom the $31 891,Bll benefit obtained last year by seven top

.
Chrysler Corporation execut1ws through options. · The size
.

ot th9 Chrysler

executives' profits was attacked. in Congress by Senator Albert Gore,

Democrat of Tennessee •••• Sem.tor Gore said he was not charging t.bat the
Chl-yslero officials v.lolated any law or that their company :ts alone in the

practice, although he said be believes Chi"ysler took unusual advantage of it.

22 Standard ,9!! CC!Jl.P!n:r
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'This stock option privilege is a tax abuse which 1e growing,' he said,.

t

It

is detrimental to the interests of the stockholders of the canpany involved
and it is unfair to all other taxpayers. t n

George H. Love.. Chrysler chairman defended the option plan. He said

it was an incentive to the company"•s management and "helped the canpany write
· one of the finest comeback stories in the annals

or American business."

"Tiro years ago Chrysler was noundering, n he said. "The search for top

managanent candidates outside the company was fruitless-no one

wanted the

job. We tinall1' decided to entrust the fortunes ot the corporation to the
younger but experienced and aggl"G&aiva men who were running it on an interim
basis.

B;y using stock incentives already approved b;y shareholders and thus

holding out the opportunitY' to share in the company•a improvanent, good men

both in and out ot the corporation were persuaded to tackle this reall.7
formidable task."
It would appear that Oheysler stockholders, :Lt they complain of these
executives' benefits, should at least have mixed emotions •. Adjusting for
stock splits since this new management took control of Chrysler's destilJY',
the corporation's common atock has increased tran a market value ot $15.oo
per share to a recent high of $49.00. Stockholders genera~ have shared

the same benefits as have those few top-management option holders.

Assuming that these management option holders each had a taxable income

ot 3150,000 for 1963, exclusive
of

$555,967 ($31 8911 611 divided

of the gains .from these options, the addition
by' 7) regular incme would have resulted in

an additional Federal income tax ot approx1matel.7 90 per cent ot the

8$S1 967,

or 3S00,370. BY" reason of the long-term capital gain benefit under the
restricted stock options, the 8S5S,967 bonus could not reeult in an additional

Federal
income. tax greater than
.
'

'

2~~

ot the bonus, or $138,992. The saving

ot $361,378 per man is obviousl.Y' substant1al.
While the inccme tax savings to the option holden 1s quite substantial,
an7 stockholder who held stock during th18 period enjoyed tax benefits.at
least equal to the benefits of the option holders.

Although restricted stock options have always been highly controversial
and un:ier more or less constant attack trom several sides, the tact that
· Congress, the lmr, the courts, and most stockholders have generally approved
would seem justification enough.
gt"anting management the chance

But the most persuasive vindication for

to gain more at less risk than the ordinar;y

investor is tbat this ahould make executives much more conscious ot their
responsibility to stockholders, and perhaps produce larger profits for all.
However the legislation first passed in

19~,

which conferred Federal

income tax benefits on restricted stock options has only recent]3been
materia~

changed by the Revenue Act of

1964, which was enacted Febl"tJa17 26,

19£>4.
Some ot the new rllles are as tollowsi
l. For full tax benefit, the stock must be held tor three yeare af'te1'

cuercise..

(Form.er]¥ the holding period was six months after exercise

and two years atter grant.)

2. Grantee of option must be an employee of the granting corporation, ita

parent or subsidiary, continuously trom grant to three months prior to
exercise.

(Formerl.3' a break 1n employment did not disqualify a restricted

option if an employee were such at the time of grant and w1thin three

months ot exercise.)
3. There must be a plan runnillg tar not more than ten years specit'y:l.ng the
total option shares and the anployees or classes of employees to receive
options. Stockholders must approve the plan within twelve months before
or atter :lts adoption.

(There was no such provision f ormerl:y',)

4. Options rray run for not more than five

years after

(Former~,·

grant.

the period was ten years.)

S. At

the time of grant, the employee rray- not

own, direct4" or

indirect~,

more .than 5% ot the stock (in voting power or value). It equity capital
1s $1,000,000 or less, the S% is increased to 10%.

(Fomerly, the

restriction was 10% ot voting power regardless or capital but larger
stockholders could qualify, subject to l5miting conditions.)

6. For full tax benefit, the option price must not be less

market price ot stock at the time ot grant. A lesser

than~

pal"

ot

cent does not

necessarily disqual:UY the option, but results in an increased tax.

(Formerly, option plans were disqualli'ied it the option price was less
than

85%.)

7. Var!able options are not allowed.

(They were allowed, former~.)

8. To prevent a dOlrllllard readjustment of the price, a qualified option must

provide that it is not to be exercised until any prior qualified or
restricted options are f'ul.13' exercised or lapsed. nth certain exceptions.
(Former]1', additional restricted stock options could be granted and downward price adjustment was allowed in sane cases.)

Ev1dent1¥ the number and the size of these option plans must have been

ot considerable magnitude to haw warranted the time and attention reoentl.1'
given by Congress in the New Federal Income Tax Law (The Revenue Act of 196b)
and it w1ll be interesting to see how the corporations lfith stock option
plans adjust to the new restrictions and how soon they tind a way to accom-

plish the end result that was heretofore permissible, one that they obvioual.1'
considered very desirable and beneficial.
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